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FOREWORD: COMBATING TERRORIST FINANCING
Richard Gordon & Christyn Rossman†
As with all human endeavors, successful terrorism requires resources, which is why even prior to the tragic events of September 11, 2001,
combating terrorist financing has been an important law enforcement tool.1
With the increased focus on terrorism after September 11, governments,
scholars, and practitioners have raised many questions regarding how best
to combat terrorist financing. What party is best suited to bear the burden of
compliance: government or financial institutions? Can informal financial
systems be regulated without unreasonable burdens? Do non-profit institutions deserve heightened scrutiny?
In an effort to help answer these questions, the Case Western Reserve University School of Law’s Institute for Global Security Law and
Policy hosted a symposium entitled, “The World Conference on Combating
Terrorist Financing,” from April 10 to 11, 2008. The symposium was part of
the International Association of Penal Law’s two-day Preparatory Colloquium for its Eighteenth International Congress of Penal Law.2 This issue
features the articles generated from the symposium.
COMBATING MONEY LAUNDERING AND TERRORIST FINANCING
Anti-money laundering (AML) and combating the financing of terrorism (CFT) preventive measures create a constant tension between finanAssociate Professor Case Western Reserve University School of Law and Visiting
Assistance Professor of International Studies, Brown University. B.A., Yale; J.D., Harvard
Law School. Following the attacks of September 11, 2001, Professor Gordon was appointed
to the select IMF Task Force on Terrorism Finance and was a principal author of the report
on the role of the IMF and World Bank in countering terrorism finance and money laundering. He was also a principal author of the 2002 methodology for assessment of compliance
with the Financial Action Task Force’s 40 + 9 Recommendations on anti-money laundering
and combating the financing of terrorism.
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1
See G.A. Res. 51/210, ¶ 3(f), U.N. Doc. A/RES/51/210 (Dec. 17, 1996); see also International Convention for the Suppression of the Financing of Terrorism, Dec. 9, 1999, S.
Treaty Doc. No. 106-9, 2178 U.N.T.S. 229.
2
A webcast of the conference is available at http://law.case.edu/centers/igslp/webcast.as
p?dt=20080411.
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cial institutions and governments over the responsibility to catch potential
money launderers and terrorist financers. International AML/CFT standards
and domestic laws place considerable responsibility to discover launderers
and terrorist financers squarely on the shoulders of financial institutions.
AML/CFT preventive measures are fundamentally different from other,
truly prudential rules that are designed to protect the safety and soundness
of individual financial institutions and the financial system as whole. Before
AML rules were established, banks did not consider themselves in the business of catching criminals. Similarly, before the addition of CFT rules they
did not consider themselves in the business of catching terrorists. Even the
link between AMT and CFT regulations is not entirely apparent. The antimoney laundering principles were designed to stop crooks from taking dirty
money, running it through a bank or other financial institution, and in doing
so, hiding that it was their money or that it was the proceeds of crime. Yet
combating terrorism financing does not focus on the origin of money, but
more critically on the ultimate use of the money.
A central actor in AMT/CFT regulation is the Financial Action
Task Force (FATF), an inter-governmental body designed to adopt and implement measures designed to counter the use of the financial system by
criminals.3 One of the first acts of the FATF was to create a list of 40 Recommendations against money laundering. The 40 Recommendations were
(more or less) divided into three subject areas: (1) strictly criminal law and
enforcement: (2) international cooperation; and (3) “preventive measures
for financial institutions.” Those so called “preventive measures” included
such matters as banning bank secrecy, monitoring of client accounts for
suspicious transactions that might indicate money laundering, and reporting
such suspicions to appropriate government authorities.
In the aftermath of the September 11 terrorist attacks, the FATF
was tasked with expanding its 40 recommendations against money laundering to include terrorism finance, and a few weeks later the FATF adopted
the 8 Special Recommendations against Terrorism Finance.4 While terrorism had existed before 9/11, the FATF 40 had made no explicit reference to
it.
Some of the 40 original FATF recommendations were easily extended to terrorism financing. With respect to criminal enforcement, the
FATF 40 required criminalizing money laundering, signing on to relevant
international treaties, and cooperating with other countries in investigating
and prosecuting such cases. These requirements were extended to crimina3

Financial Action Task Force, The Forty Recommendations (June 20, 2003),
http://www.fatf-gafi.org/dataoecd/7/40/34849567.pdf.
4
Financial Action Task Force, Special Recommendations on Terrorist Financing (Oct.
22, 2004), http://www.fatf-gafi.org/dataoecd/8/17/34849466.pdf.
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lizing terrorism financing, signing on to relevant treaties concerning terrorism, and cooperating in terrorism financing cases. The FATF also extended
preventive measures to include terrorism financing. For example, Special
Recommendation IV extends suspicious transaction/activity reporting to
terrorism financing transactions.5
The increased compliance requirements targeting financial institutions prompted concerns as to whether the procedures would prevent terrorist acts or unnecessarily complicate the flow of monetary funds. Sue Eckert,
Former Assistant Secretary of Export Administration, noted that “[i]n a rush
to action following the terrorist attacks, existing AML measures were extended, largely unmodified, to address terrorist financing.”6 Even the
FATF’s guidance acknowledged that financial institutions will probably be
unable to detect terrorist financing unless a known terrorist opens an account.7
In light of institutional concerns and emerging empirical data, complex questions regarding effective measures to combat the financing of terrorism exist. In order to best address these questions, the “World Conference on Combating Terrorist Financing” symposium was organized into
four distinct panel discussions: (1) Issues in Formal Financial Institutions;
(2) Issues in Informal Funds and Value Transfer Systems; (3) Charities and
Special Recommendation VIII; and (4) Key Developments in Enforcement
and Asset Seizure. During the panel discussions, current and former government officials, scholars, and practitioners, shared their thoughts and
ideas regarding the legal and practical issues associated with combating the
financing of terrorism.
OVERVIEW OF THE SYMPOSIUM ISSUE
The forward-looking articles in this issue not only outline current
problems in combating terrorism financing but also suggest possible avenues for solving these problems. In Time to Re-examine Regulation Designed to Counter the Financing of Terrorism, Richard Barrett, Coordinator
of the United Nations Al Qaida Monitoring Team, details from his personal
perspective how regulation contributed to defensive measures to combat
terrorism. Barrett analyzes the impact of regulation based on evidence of
how Al Qaida leaders and local cells acquired funds for their operations.

5

Id. at 1.
Sue Eckert, The US Regulatory Approach to Terrorist Financing, in COUNTERING THE
FINANCING OF TERRORISM 209, 217 (Thomas J. Biersteker & Sue E. Eckert eds., 2008).
7
Financial Action Task Force, Guidance for Financial Institutions in Detecting Terrorist
Financing (April 24, 2002), http://www.fatf-gafi.org/dataoecd/39/21/34033955.pdf.
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Barrett contrasts the financing methodology of the Taliban and Al Qaida to
demonstrate the limited effectiveness of financial regulations.8
Jimmy Gurulé, Professor of Law at Notre Dame Law School, explores efforts by the United Nations to combat terrorist financing in The
Demise of the U.N. Economic Sanctions Regime to Deprive Terrorists of
Funding. Professor Gurulé surveys the implementation and effect of the
U.N. Security Council resolutions that form an international assets freeze
program. By examining the legal challenges to domestic implementation of
the resolutions, the article analyzes possible weaknesses in the program’s
future success. Professor Gurulé outlines several important recommendations for enhancing the effectiveness of the counter-terrorism sanctions program.9
From an alternative perspective, Applying Asset Recovery Concepts
to Disrupt Terrorist Financing outlines the advantages of pursuing the personal assets of terrorists. Authors Jack Smith, former Deputy General Counsel of the Federal Deposit Insurance Corporation, and Gregory Cooper, a
Fulbright Scholar at the Basel Institute of Governance, cite terrorist organization’s efforts raise funds worldwide through “witting and unwitting” contributions from mosques, non-governmental organizations, wealthy donors,
and charitable foundations as a potential source of civil litigation. Based on
the positive impact of civil and criminal asset recovery enacted by AntiTerrorism Act of 1992 in the United States, the authors conclude aggressive
asset recovery programs could serve as a powerful tool in combating terrorism.10
Ross Delston, former Consulting Counsel for the AML/CFT Unit at
the International Monetary Fund, and Stephen Walls, an R. Michael Gadbaw Fellow on the International Law & Policy Team of the General Electric
Company, propose that a Financial Action Task Force recommendation
regulating trade based money laundering would close a relatively untouched
avenue of terrorist financing. In Reaching Beyond Banks: How to Target
Trade-Based Money Laundering and Terrorist Financing Outside the Financial Sector, Delston and Walls illustrate that the Financial Action Task
Force’s prior success using “name and shame” sanctions could extend regulatory pressure beyond financial institutions to business organizations. Preventing trade based money laundering involves crafting a compliance program that extends to business organizations engaged in trade. According to
Delston and Walls, requiring parties in the international supply chain to
8
Richard Barrett, Time to Re-examine Regulation Designed to Counter the Financing of
Terrorism, 41 CASE W. RES. J. INT’L 7 (2009).
9
Jimmy Gurulé , The Demise of the U.N. Economic Sanctions Regime to Deprive Terrorists of Funding, 41 CASE W. RES. J. INT’L 19 (2009).
10
Jack D. Smith & Gregory J. Cooper, Applying Asset Recovery Concepts to Disrupt
Terrorist Financing, 41 CASE W. RES. J. INT’L 65 (2009).
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adopt AML safeguards to protect their businesses, could curtail trade-based
money laundering as a terrorist financing channel.11
The International Association of Penal Law’s General Report on
Terrorism Financing, composed by Northeastern University College of
Criminal Justice Professor Nikos Passas, sets forth a resolution draft for
consideration at the Eighteenth International Congress of Penal Law.12 The
report and resolution draft are reprinted from the International Review of
Penal Law. The report digests the empirical data collected in fifteen national
reports submitted to the International Association of Penal Law’s. The regulatory summary supports the resolution drafts proposal for “an adequate
system of targeting terrorism finance.”13
The articles in this symposium issue are among the most important
yet written on the topic of terrorism financing because of their emphasis on
solutions. The articles of Richard Barrett and Jimmy Gurulé not only underscore the difficulties in stopping terrorism financing, but also suggest
how a change in focus may lead to beneficial developments, especially in
the sanctions program. Jack Smith and Gregory Cooper, while noting past
difficulties in seizing financial assets of terrorists, propose using existing
asset recovery techniques to go further in tracing and seizing terrorist assets.
While Ross Delston and Stephen Walls note a potentially huge loophole for
terrorist financing in the use of trade invoicing, they propose crafting an
effective antiterrorism financing compliance program for companies that
could go a long way to closing that loophole. Finally, Nikos Passas’s proposed resolution draws together key elements of anti-terrorism financing
with concern for protecting fundamental human rights. Collectively, the
articles in this symposium issue propose forward-looking solutions to combating the financing of terrorism and provide a key reference for anyone
working in the field.

11
Ross Delston & Stephen Walls, Reaching Beyond Banks: How to Target Trade-Based
Money Laundering and Terrorist Financing Outside the Financial Sector, 41 CASE W. RES.
J. INT’L 85 (2009).
12
General Report, 79 INT’L REV. OF PENAL L. 325 (2008), reprinted in 41 CASE W. RES. J.
INT’L 243 (2009).
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General Report, 41 CASE W. RES. J. INT’L L. 263, 264 (2009).

